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We focus on recent progress in reforming the role of forests and other land use in the EU
climate policy framework. EU inclusion of LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change and
Forestry) in the climate policy framework still lags international developments, remaining
at odds even with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s
(UNFCCC) Kyoto framework. Though the EU has made some important changes that eclipse
even the UNFCCC framework—in particular regarding the inclusion of cropland and grazing
land management in mandatory EU-level carbon accounting practices—in other respects
the EU has far to go. As part of a strategy for fulfilling emission reduction commitments
within the EU burden-sharing agreement, Member states are not permitted to trade either in
domestically nor foreign produced forest-based carbon credits. On the other hand, both the
EU and the UNFCCC/Kyoto LULUCF frameworks remain distant from an idealized model that
could facilitate increased climate change mitigation and a more efficient and balanced use
of forest-based resources. Limiting the incorporation of forests in the climate policy
framework has significant consequences for the cost and rapidity of emission reductions.
Forest potential thus remains under-mobilized for climate change mitigation. In this
context, we draw particular attention to the fact that forest-based carbon sequestration’s
potential contribution to negative emissions represents an important missed opportunity. In
the context of ongoing discussions over the EU and UNFCCC’s Post-Kyoto frameworks, we
propose an all-encompassing LULUCF carbon accounting model incorporating all previously
omitted carbon pools and activities, thus weighing LULUCF removals and emissions on a par
with emissions from other sectors (industry, the energy sector, end-users). The successful
integration of LULUCF into the EU climate policy and carbon-trading frameworks could
dovetail neatly with emerging international climate change mitigation efforts.
# 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/3.0/).
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: EllisonDL@Gmail.Com (D. Ellison).
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envscihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.03.004
1462-9011/# 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 0 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 – 1 521. Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (UNFCCC) Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech-
nological Advice (SBSTA) has invited Parties and admitted
observer organizations to submit views on issues related to ‘a
more comprehensive accounting of anthropogenic emissions
by sources and removals by sinks from Land Use, Land-Use
Change and Forestry (LULUCF), including through a more
inclusive activity- or land-based approach’ (UNFCCC, 2012a).
Independently of the SBSTA discussion, the European
Union and other countries are likewise actively engaged in
thinking about how LULUCF can be more strongly integrated
into the climate policy framework. In March 2012, the
European Commission introduced a proposal for harmonizing
LULUCF carbon accounting and the incorporation of Cropland
and Grassland Management (CM and GM) in mandatory
accounting (EC, 2012a). The Commission proposal was
formally approved in March 2013. At the same time, the
Commission published an Impact Assessment addressing the
broader question of integrating LULUCF into the general EU
climate policy framework (EC, 2012b). And in July 2012 the EU
likewise responded to the SBSTA call (UNFCCC, 2012b).
Though SBSTA and EU efforts have developed indepen-
dently, they are not unrelated. Moreover, the relative impor-
tance of the EU and the position it takes in international
negotiations encourages us to consider these discussions in
parallel. The current environment is ripe for significant reform
of both the UNFCCC and EU LULUCF carbon accounting
frameworks. As part of the next step to defining the UNFCCC’s
Post-2020 framework, a revised EU strategy could feed directly
into current plans to conclude a general and potentially legally
binding UNFCCC agreement in 2015 (or later).
This article focuses on the EU position regarding the future
inclusion of LULUCF in the EU and international climate policy
frameworks. In particular, we assess EU willingness to
consider and develop a more comprehensive and firmly
integrated LULUCF framework and how it might interact with
ongoing international efforts. The EU has long resisted the
inclusion of LULUCF in the climate policy framework. To-date,
LULUCF-generated carbon credits still cannot be traded in the
EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). And domestic, forest-
based carbon credits further remain subject to substantial
limitations resulting from the UNFCCC and Kyoto-based
carbon accounting framework. Further, unlike other Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) credits, forest-based credits
generated through the CDM cannot be traded in the EU ETS.
Significant untapped opportunities thus remain for achiev-
ing rapid and cost efficient emission reductions in the EU, as
well as in the larger Kyoto and global climate mitigation
frameworks. We evaluate the current EU proposals for a
revised LULUCF strategy in the context of work on the
‘‘Incentive Gap’’ (IG, Ellison et al., 2011, 2013) and consider
the potential for the full mobilization of forest-based LULUCF
resources for the purposes of climate change mitigation. The
IG measures the ‘share of carbon sequestration (net removals)
not incentivized in the regulatory framework’ and measures
this amount both for the activity Forest Management (FM) and
across the broad range of LULUCF-based carbon pools andactivities: harvested wood products (HWP), afforestation,
reforestation and deforestation (ARD), cropland management
(CM), grazing land management (GM), Wetlands and unman-
aged forests. The IG concept thus highlights and operationa-
lizes the share of missed opportunities embedded in the UNFCCC
and Kyoto-based carbon accounting frameworks. The IG
concept further highlights a potential framework for improv-
ing LULUCF carbon accounting and improving climate change
mitigation efforts.
Though the EU has the potential to fully mobilize forest-
based resources by fully integrating LULUCF into its climate
policy framework, we argue the full carbon value of all forest-
based activities is not currently recognized, in particular in the
EU carbon-trading scheme. Full LULUCF integration would sit
well with ongoing international efforts to integrate forests into
the climate policy framework, in particular in the context of
REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation). We shed particular light on the important
potential for a forest contribution to negative emissions typically
neglected in climate mitigation strategies.
On the basis of an ‘‘idealized’’ carbon accounting model
and its comparison with the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol (KP)
framework provided in Section 1, we then address the
international carbon-trading framework in Section 2. Section
3 analyzes support for and the development of EU strategies
for integrating LULUCF into the climate policy framework. The
fourth Section assesses the impact of the Post-Durban
outcome on the EU Member states and its meaning for the
potential mobilization of forest potential in the climate policy
framework. This section first considers the new ‘‘cap’’ and
then addresses the new Forest Management Reference Levels
(FMRL). Section 5 provides a discussion of forest potential in
the climate policy framework and assesses the particular
singularity of negative emissions. We close with a discussion of
the current EU strategy and some remarks on what a ‘more
comprehensive carbon accounting framework’ might include.
2. The international LULUCF carbon
accounting framework and our idealized model
Ellison et al. (2011, 2013) introduce a LULUCF carbon accounting
model that attempts to balance interests across the various
components of the forest value chain—in particular bioenergy,
harvested wood products (HWP) and standing forests. In a
balanced, climate-based model, all components of the chain
should be equally weighted according to their full carbon value and
thus their true climate change mitigation potential. From a
climate perspective, forest resources would then more likely be
used in a balanced and efficient manner and would be fully
mobilized in the interest of climate change mitigation. The
effective mobilization of forest-based resources for climate
change mitigation is best facilitated with a strategy that places
LULUCF on a par with other sectors (energy, industry, the non-
ETS sector) in the climate policy and carbon-trading frameworks.
Because this model weighs all LULUCF emissions and
removals according to their true climate change mitigation
potential, each country would then have the option to achieve
climate targets either by reducing emissions in other sectors,
increasing removals in the LULUCF sector, or both. This should
Table 1 – Pre-, Post-Durban Rules for LULUCF carbon accounting and idealized model.
Kyoto rules LULUCF Pre-Durban (CP1: 2008–2012) Post-Durban (CP2: 2013–2020) Idealized model
FM election Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory
‘‘cap’’ on FM carbon credits 3% of 1990 emissions, 15% of actual
net removals (whichever smaller,
or negotiated)
3.5% 1990 emissions No cap
Reference level (accounting
method)
Reference level = ‘‘0’’ (gross-net) Projected, historical or reference
level = ‘‘0’’ (net-net)
Estimate new baseline using average
net removals in previous commitment
period (continuous gross-net)
Carbon pools and activities Many carbon pools and activities
omitted (HWP, CM, GM, wetlands,
unmanaged forests, etc.)
HWP included (limited by ‘‘cap’’),
but many carbon pools and
activities omitted
Include all carbon pools and activities
in one all-encompassing National
Forest Inventory
Offsetting of net ARD
emissions
Permitted Not permitted Collapse Arts. 3.3 & 3.4
Note: Under the Kyoto Protocol, stock changes in carbon pools are fully accounted under Art. 3.3 (Afforestation and Reforestation, AR and
Deforestation, D), but discounted by a cap under Forest Management (Art. 3.4, FM). If FM was elected for the first commitment period (CP1), net
emissions from ARD could be offset by net removals from FM. The idealized model strives to include and integrate all carbon pools without
restriction.
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tion and use of forest-based resources, thereby facilitating
more rapid climate change mitigation.
Our idealized model presented in Table 1 (Ellison et al., 2013)
differs substantially from current practice under the UNFCCC/
Kyoto framework, in particular because it eliminates dis-
counting in the LULUCF sector. To achieve a more balanced
and efficient use of forest-based resources, the international
policy framework must be substantially modified. In particu-
lar, all barriers to the mobilization of increased forest growth
and forest-based carbon sequestration such as the cap should
be removed. Moreover, all LULUCF pools and activities should
be collapsed into one mandatory all-encompassing activity and
inventory, and all forest-based sinks (and sources) should be
weighted according to their true climate potential. Ellison et al.
(2011, 2013) further argue the full carbon value of all LULUCF
activities should be fully mobilized within the international
carbon-trading framework.
Both the EU and the UNFCCC/Kyoto-based carbon account-
ing frameworks remain distant from achieving these goals. A
significant ‘‘Incentive Gap’’ (IG) continues to block the
effective mobilization of forest-based resources (Ellison
et al., 2011, 2013). Although changes agreed in Durban raise
the total share of permissible carbon credits—the ‘‘cap’’—to
3.5% of 1990 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a significant IG
remains (Ellison et al., 2013).
Further reforms are necessary. At a bare minimum, Art. 3.3
(the net of Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation, ARD)
and Art. 3.4 (FM) should be collapsed into a single category,
thereby more strongly encouraging net removals and future
forest growth under FM, where the lion’s share of net removals
occur (Ellison et al., 2013). Moreover, this would greatly
strengthen the promotion of forest potential in what is genuinely
the largest area of potential ‘‘human-induced’’ forest activity. Since
both Art. 3.3 and 3.4 are powerfully linked to anthropogenic
manipulation, concepts of human-induced vs. natural growth do
not logically support their separation. Ideally, however, all caps
and limitations should be removed from the system.
The ‘‘idealized model’’ ultimately attempts to provide a
neutral framework within which individual countries candecide for themselves which forest-based activities should be
favored. As Ellison et al. (2011, 2013) argue, what is not
‘‘counted’’ in the EU and international carbon accounting
frameworks is not likely to figure in the thinking and strategies
applied to forest-based resources. The current UNFCCC/
Kyoto-based model ultimately favors bioenergy use, while
the carbon sequestered in HWP or standing forests is not
consistently counted or incentivized. The cap, in particular,
significantly discounts standing forests, while emissions from
bioenergy combustion are considered neutral. Since restrictions
of this kind result in weighting sectors or pools differently, all
restrictions should be removed. Though this problematic has
been favorably modified under the Second Commitment
Period (CP2), these changes do not go far enough.
The current strategy is likely to provide stronger incentives
in favor of harvesting additional forest growth for bioenergy.
Under the First Commitment Period (CP1), all biomass was
assumed immediately oxidized and emitted to the atmosphere
at the time of harvest. This favored bioenergy use compared
with traditional forest based products. Under the CP2, HWP is
subject to mandatory accounting using the ‘‘Production ap-
proach’’–which credits increasing stocks in domestically pro-
duced HWP. Though this represents a step forward, as a carbon
pool under FM, HWP remains capped and HWP from deforesta-
tion (Art. 3.3) is considered immediately oxidized.
The neutral framework we propose supports the broader
diversity of potential climate change mitigation actions
without disadvantaging individual country strategies. More-
over, for countries favoring the promotion of increased stocks
in standing forests or HWP, this model would correct the
accounting imbalance currently favoring bioenergy. Nor does
this approach marginalize the option for countries choosing to
maximize biomass production. Though the model does not
inherently favor biodiversity protection or the development of
protected areas over the optimal exploitation of forest-based
resources, it does provide a framework in which countries and
individual actors can more easily promote these options. The
explicit advantage of this model is its potential for optimizing
cost efficient and effective climate solutions and for allowing
Parties to freely pursue alternative scenarios.
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framework
Where LULUCF carbon accounting is concerned, the greatest
variation from UNFCCC practice in the EU framework
concerns the fact that EU Member states are not permitted
to apply forest-based carbon credits toward their EU level
emission reduction commitments (though these are reported to
the UNFCCC) and they are further not permitted to trade in
forest-based carbon credits within the EU Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS).
The emerging international carbon-trading framework,
however, clearly governs and incentivizes the integration of
forests into the UNFCCC/Kyoto and international climate policy
frameworks. Without this, for example, incentives for promot-
ing both REDD+ strategies and forest-based carbon sequestra-
tion in Annex I countries are likely to be greatly diminished.
At the international level, commitment to incentivizing the
world’s forests in the carbon-trading framework is mixed.
Based on the KP, countries have the right to trade in Removal
Units (RMU’s) from Afforestation, Reforestation and Defores-
tation (ARD, Art. 3.3), FM (Art. 3.4), and in Certified Emission
Reductions (CER’s) through CDM investments. RMU’s and CER’s
are, for the most part, restricted to carbon removals generated
under Art. 3.3. Tradable credits from carbon sequestration (net
removals) under FM are limited by the ‘‘cap’’ (for all Annex I
countries), by the Linking Directive (for all EU Member states),
and are further not eligible under the framework of the CDM
mechanism. This limits CER’s to Afforestation and Reforesta-
tion efforts (Art. 12).
The vast majority of the world’s forests, on the other hand,
remains outside the carbon accounting framework and thus at
best remains only weakly incentivized (Ellison et al., 2013). The
incorporation of LULUCF into the international climate policy
framework thus remains underdeveloped. To-date, only the
voluntary forest-based carbon market, the New Zealand ETS
and the California Forest Protocol and Carbon-Trading
schemes potentially provide unrestricted frameworks for
promoting forest-based carbon sequestration. On the Europe-
an side, forest-based carbon offsetting is discouraged by the
fact that forest-based CDM credits are not permitted in the
EU’s ETS.
The carbon-trading schemes emerging in the EU, Australia,
California, New Zealand and other countries and regions are
gradually diverging. While the New Zealand and California
models are receptive to the inclusion of forest-based carbon
credits and represent suitable vehicles for funding REDD+
opportunities, the EU model excludes forest-based carbon
credits from the system and the UNFCCC/Kyoto framework
imposes comparatively strict limits on which LULUCF-based
carbon removals can be traded. This presumably has an
important impact on REDD+ funding from EU Member Annex I
states and slows any movement toward a potential future
global forest transition (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2011; Waggoner
and Ausubel, 2001).
Some schemes are likewise becoming more disconnected
from the UNFCCC/Kyoto agreement. After the 2012 Doha
COP18 meetings, New Zealand declared its intention to leave
the KP, suggesting its carbon-trading scheme will only beloosely connected with this system. The degree to which
California emission trading will link with the UNFCCC/Kyoto
framework is likewise unclear. Despite ongoing efforts to link
carbon-trading regimes across the EU, Australia and possibly
also the US (Zetterberg, 2012), increasing diversity in emerging
carbon markets risks driving a wedge between those countries
that accept and incorporate forest-based carbon credits and
those that do not. Though the EU and Australia announced
their intention to link their emission trading schemes in 2012,
other regions remain outside this framework (http://ec.eur-
opa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2012082801_en.htm).
Increasing diversity may have potentially negative effects
on the ability to mobilize the world’s forests in the
international framework. Though the forest-based CDM
market began to show rapid positive growth in 2010, the
REDD market collapsed by 59% the following year (Ecosystem
Marketplace, 2011, 2012). Many factors have contributed to
this fall. The failure to conclude a successful and legally
binding emission reduction agreement at the last five
Conference of the Party (COP) meetings in Copenhagen, Cancun,
Durban, Doha and Warsaw provides little encouragement for
countries to engage in carbon-trading markets or invest in
programs such as REDD+. Further, the list of Kyoto dropout
countries is lengthening (Canada, Japan, Russia and now New
Zealand) and the US never succeeded in ratifying its original
1998 KP commitment. Though some countries considered
rejoining (Japan), commitment to the international framework
is tenuous. Finally, the global economic recession had a
significant impact on willingness to further develop climate
mitigation strategies and the funding of carbon offsetting
initiatives such as REDD+. All the above factors together
contribute to one final explanatory factor—the collapse in
carbon prices.
The successful incorporation of LULUCF into the EU’s
climate policy framework and the potential for trading FM and
CDM forest-based carbon credits could go a long way to further
mobilizing support for the inclusion of LULUCF and REDD+ in
international bargaining frameworks such as the Post-Kyoto
strategy. However, the potential integration of LULUCF into
the EU climate policy framework may still be several years
away. Moreover, future modifications to the EU forest-based
CDM framework are not part of current discussions.
4. The developing EU position on LULUCF
The inclusion of forests in the KP carbon accounting
framework has long been controversial. Though signed in
1997, the final decision regarding the inclusion of forests and
forestry was not made until much later at COP 7 in 2001.
Countries like Japan and others held up the process (Fry, 2002).
Some were concerned LULUCF activities could undermine the
environmental integrity of the KP and that forest rich parties
could potentially abuse forest growth in order to escape their
commitments to reduce emissions. The inclusion of LULUCF
in the Kyoto framework has therefore included limitations on
the role LULUCF can play—guided in particular by the ‘‘cap’’ on
carbon credits under FM.
Though the FM cap has multiple aims (Ellison et al., 2011,
2013), limitations on the mobilization of LULUCF in the climate
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forest-based resources in the climate change mitigation (and
adaptation) framework and may make fewer attempts to
minimize the impact of natural disturbances. This limits vast
potential for forest-based carbon sequestration as well as for
promoting adaptation and combatting deforestation. Such
barriers are not in the spirit of the Kyoto enterprise. And since
other strategies have generally been adopted to address
disturbances or reduce the potential for taking advantage of
historical growth (e.g. the FMRL), caps have ultimately lost their
meaning in the general framework. Moreover, we have consid-
erable difficulty viewing any stock changes in carbon sequestra-
tion as ‘undeserved’: contributions to the net carbon sink are
contributions to global climate change mitigation efforts.
To-date, however, LULUCF remains a secondary appendage
in the climate policy framework: successful LULUCF-based
carbon sequestration and emissions are recorded in UNFCCC
reporting but not accounted in the EU burden-sharing commit-
ment and emission reduction framework. Resistance toward
the positive integration of LULUCF into the EU’s climate policy
framework and, in particular, into the EU ETS, persists. In
revising the EU strategy for CP2 (2013–2020), the EU’s 2020
Climate and Energy package did not even attempt to model the
impact of incorporating LULUCF (EC, 2008: 36–7) and ultimate-
ly left LULUCF out of the EU climate policy framework. The EU
ETS Directive (both the previous Directive (2003/87/EC)
covering the first CP1 and the newer Directive (2009/29/EC)
covering CP2, as well as the EU Linking Directive (2004/101/EC)
do not allow the use of domestic forest credits, nor do they
permit forest-based credits from CDM and Joint Implementa-
tion (JI) projects in the EU ETS. The Linking Directive (2004/101/
EC) explicitly rejects the potential use of CER’s and ERU’s from
LULUCF (see also Swedish EPA, 2006). Although Member states
are not restricted from supporting CDM-based forest invest-
ments, the resulting carbon credits cannot be used to fulfill EU-
level emission reduction commitments.
Despite widespread support for the incorporation of
LULUCF in the EU climate policy framework, the ECCP (2010)
and the Commission’s Impact Assessment (EC, 2012b) note
several difficulties including problems of uncertainty in the
estimates of sequestered carbon, the lack of annually based
LULUCF reporting cycles, and uncertainty over whether
LULUCF should be incorporated into the EU’s ETS or into
the commitment mechanism. In addition to these, the
European Commission’s Impact Assessment (EC, 2012b)
likewise points to the problem of inter-annual variation in
net forest emissions (removals). Since the EU ETS currently
requires information about individual installations (forest
owners), incorporating LULUCF into the EU ETS could require
some manipulation and would require a significant adminis-
trative apparatus. Further, the current EU ETS is based on
annual compliance, while national forest inventories are
based on longer-term cycles (ECCP, 2010).
There is likewise considerable antipathy toward any weak-
ening of the EU ETS that might result from a possible reduction of
carbon prices or reduced incentives to cut ETS sector emissions.
Some worry individual countries could take advantage of LULUCF
to minimize emission reduction requirements in other sectors,
i.e. that integration of LULUCF into the EU ETS could weaken the
pressures placed on high-emitting industries and the fossilfuel-based power sector to reduce emissions. Others are
concerned about the potential ‘‘intensification’’ of LULUCF
activities, whether by more intensive planting regimes or
fertilization. Tensions between the competing uses of forest-
based resources are evident at the heart of the European Climate
Change Programme (ECCP) one of the EU-level bodies assigned
the task of evaluating EU climate policy.
Many EU Member states and Annex I signatories are slow to
accept change. Sweden, for example, like many EU Member
states and Annex I countries, is resistant to modifications of
the existing rules that may result in higher levels of
uncertainty and risk. Moreover, intergovernmental decision-
making on Kyoto practices requires consensus on the part of
all participating Parties and signatories, thus encouraging
incrementalism. Large changes in the Kyoto framework are
difficult to pursue.
Among EU Member states, nine out of twenty-seven chose
not to account for FM under CP1—Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Slovakia—and Malta failed to specify a cap. Though most EU
Member states had caps that permitted the accounting of
carbon removals under FM, the decision not to elect FM meant
this share of carbon sequestration could not be counted and
thus was not ‘‘incentivized’’. The 2011 LULUCF agreement
reached in Durban renders FM reporting mandatory in CP2.
Thus, although some countries exhibited a tendency to shield
their forest resource from accounting, this option has now
been foreclosed.
Maintaining a highly compartmentalized climate policy
framework that explicitly rejects the trading of carbon credits
across the growing number of pillars in the EU system
weakens the potential cost-efficiency and effectiveness of
the system. The current EU climate policy framework already
does not permit the trading of carbon credits across the EU
ETS, non-ETS and the renewable energy directive sectors.
Moreover, countries can potentially land in the awkward
position of over-fulfilling commitments in one segment, while
still being required to make up for any deficiencies (falling
short) in other segments (Ellison, 2011).
Influenced in part by background studies (Kuikman et al.,
2011; IIASA, 2011), the EU has been considering the potential
incorporation of forest carbon sinks in the climate policy
framework. In March 2012, DG Climate Action issued a draft
proposal on LULUCF GHG accounting rules that follows up on
the Durban LULUCF agreement (EC, 2012a). This current
initiative addresses the harmonization of LULUCF carbon
accounting practices across the broad set of 27 EU Member
states and the incorporation of Cropland and Grassland
Management (CM and GM). The European Council and
Parliament officially accepted this proposal and related
legislation on Mar. 12th, 2013.
Harmonization above all affects the accounting of carbon
stock changes in above and below ground biomass and soil
organic carbon under CP2 and mandatory reporting on Cropland
and Grazing land management activities (CM and GM). The
current EU LULUCF initiative thus represents an important step
beyond the 2011 Durban agreement in which Cropland and
Grazing land management reporting remains ‘‘voluntary’’ and
only ARD and FM reporting are mandatory. Subject only to
‘‘voluntary’’ reporting requirements under CP1, the majority of
Fig. 1 – FM, cropland and grazing land management as share of total average 2008–2010 emissions (exclud. LULUCF).
Source: Estimates for Cropland and Grazing land Management (CM and GM) are based on proxy estimates. Since few
countries in the world have elected these activities, we use UNFCCC reported figures for Grassland, remaining Grassland,
conversions to Grassland, Cropland, remaining cropland, and conversions to Cropland. FM and GHG emissions are based
on UNFCCC submissions.
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emissions and removals occurring on CM and GM lands.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, for a small number of EU Member
states, annual net carbon removals/emissions under CM and
GM activities exceed those under FM. Thus for states such as
Germany, the UK, Denmark, Belgium, France, Bulgaria and
others, the share of emissions under CM will likely weigh
importantly and their inclusion should significantly impact
future management practices. For other countries, the role of
FM far outweighs the addition of new activities (Latvia,
Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Lithuania and others). Thus, while
the incorporation of CM and GM represents a step forward, the
largest carbon stock changes are still found in FM.
Beyond these steps, the European Commission is consid-
ering greater inclusion of LULUCF in its climate policy
framework. Thus far however, based on official feedback,
no timetable for future steps has been considered. Given the
late date of the current decision, the EU cannot foreseeably
conclude an additional agreement by the beginning of CP2.
This means the EU can only consider further steps either mid-
way during CP2—unlikely given the impact on ongoing
accounting—or in preparation for a third commitment period
beginning sometime in 2021.The EC LULUCF report (EC 18) sets the stage for future
potential incorporation of LULUCF into the EU climate policy
framework, but stops short of making explicit recommenda-
tions about how this should be done. Possible strategies are
spelled out in two European Commission reports (EC, 2012b,c).
These include incorporation into: (1) the EU ETS, (2) the non-
ETS carbon-trading framework (under the Effort Sharing
Directive, ESD), and (3) the introduction of a new, but separate,
LULUCF-based target and commitment mechanism. The
Commission favors the 3rd option (EC, 2012b). This model
isolates the potential impact of LULUCF on the EU climate
policy framework by setting separate LULUCF targets and
retaining the current segmentation between LULUCF and the
EU ETS and non-ETS sectors.
EU discussion is partially driven by decisions at the
international level. However, the failure to develop a more
vigorous EU bargaining position may slow international
progress. A more effective and efficient international and
EU level framework for the integration of LULUCF, however, is
possible. In the interest of continued progress on raising the
forest carbon sink in both developed and developing countries
and putting a stop to deforestation and forest degradation, a
more effective and efficient LULUCF carbon accounting
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 0 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 – 1 5 7strategy is required. The EU can play an important leadership
role in this process.
Though uncertainty remains one of the key stumbling
blocks in moving forward with greater mobilization of
forest-based resources, the model proposed herein does not
embody a greater degree of uncertainty than has already been
accepted with the 2011 Durban LULUCF agreement. At the
same time, eliminating barriers (the cap and the FMRL) and
increasing the potential range of incentivized opportunities
for emission reductions and carbon sequestration available to
Member states—assuming commitments are changed accord-
ingly (we cannot stress this point enough)—could positively
support the aim of reducing emissions and mitigating future
climate change.
5. Incentive Gaps and the mobilization of
forest potential in the EU and UNFCCC frameworks
A fully developed position on the potential integration of
LULUCF in the climate policy framework must of course
address problems with the current UNFCCC/Kyoto framework.
Though the European Commission has produced an initial
reflective response to the SBSTA call for submissions
(UNFCCC, 2012b), much remains to be said about the potential
impact of the new LULUCF rules and potential paths for future
reform. We first discuss the implications of the new ‘‘cap’’,
then turn to an in-depth discussion of the new Durban FMRL.
Given relative variation in forest practice and extent across EU
member states, the following discussion is broadly represen-
tative of the general impact the Post-Durban Kyoto rules might
have on other Annex I countries.
5.1. The new ‘‘cap’’
In equity terms, more consideration could have been
dedicated to the new cap set in Durban. The new cap is set
using the same method for all Parties (3.5% of 1990 base year
emissions, excluding LULUCF) and was intended to increase
incentives for carbon sequestration under FM. However, it
remains unclear why heavy per capita emitters in 1990 should
be rewarded with a higher cap than low emitters. Further, it
remains unclear why FM caps should be entirely unrelated to
forest cover or potential future growth: the new cap in no way
considers the current share of forest cover under FM. Under
CP1 (2008–2012) countries were permitted to adopt a cap equal
to the smaller of two options (3% of 1990 emissions, or 15% of
net removals in forests), or under certain circumstances could
negotiate an alternative cap. No such adjustments, however,
are included in the new model.
To illustrate the consequences of the 2011 Durban LULUCF
agreement, we assume a 20% increase in total forest growth
between CP1 and CP2 and convert this amount into CO2
equivalents (MtonCO2/yr). Instead of using a projected
reference line, we use the average forest growth at CP1
recorded in 2008 and 2009 as a baseline for estimating the
outcome in CP2. Across all Annex I countries, during 2008 and
2009, countries averaged approximately 3% growth per year.
Given 7 years of growth over the period 2013–2020, this would
amount to approximately 21% total growth (based on aweighted average across all Annex I countries, however, the
2008–2009 growth rate is approximately 1.2% yr1). Others
have previously estimated lower levels of forest growth
(Bo¨ttcher et al., 2012).
Estimates that consider the effect of features such as forest
age class structure and other variables may provide more
accurate predictions of future forest growth for individual
countries. However, it is important to emphasize that the
growth estimate we employ is a theoretical tool intended to
provide a framework for understanding the implications of the
LULUCF carbon accounting rules for understanding the
incentives countries and forest owners face. Though variation
in the total amount of assumed growth will impact the
estimated size of the IG, we are particularly concerned with
the overall trend.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the new cap creates a heavily skewed
set of advantages and disadvantages, raising important
questions about its logic, as well as its potential to encourage
future forest growth. The red line in Fig. 2 indicates where a
15% cap on future estimated 2020 forest potential would fall
for each of the EU Member states. While points along this line
would indicate an equitable outcome and approximately equal
burden sharing, the new caps are disproportionately distrib-
uted around the line.
In particular those countries with a relatively small share of
forest cover are likely to benefit the most from the new model,
some of them dramatically so. In particular, the Netherlands,
the UK, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg and several other EU
Member states are clear winners from the new cap. The UK
and the Netherlands are particularly advantaged. However,
why the Netherlands should benefit more than the UK, or why
these two countries should benefit more than countries like
Denmark or Ireland with similar shares of forest cover
remains obscure. And why these countries should benefit
more than the set of ‘‘loser’’ countries remains equally
obscure. All those countries with higher shares of forest cover
have new caps equal to less than 15% of their estimated 2020
forest potential—sometimes considerably less.
Fig. 3 provides an indication of the degree of variation
across EU Member states in the potential impact of the Post-
Durban Kyoto rules. Each individual country column indicates
an estimate of total potential future forest growth in 2020,
distributed proportionally across net ARD, estimated bioe-
nergy use and an area corresponding to FM net removals and/
or HWP. Since we cannot know the future net distribution
across FM net removals and HWP—i.e. we cannot know the
felling rate—these two categories are represented as a single
green bar (FM + HWP). In this context, however, current
forecasts suggest a progressive increase in harvest (HWP) up
to 2020 (harvest projections were used to inform FMRL
estimations). Under CP2, ARD (since the compensation rule
was removed in Durban), bioenergy, and that amount of forest
growth and/or HWP corresponding to the new cap are fully
incentivized.
As indicated in Figs. 2 and 3, the majority of EU Member
states would presumably have little difficulty claiming the full
cap (distance between blue triangle and green diamond). For
countries like Sweden and Finland with comparatively small
caps, there is even little incentive to be concerned about the
cap. Moreover, depending on the felling rate, most or all HWP
Fig. 2 – New durban caps relative to estimated forest potential in 2020 and the Incentive Gap.
Note: the new caps are represented as ratios relative to estimated forest potential in 2020 (green points). The estimated
forest potential is based on an assumption of 20% forest growth by the year 2020 relative to the FM average in 2008 and
2009. The Incentive Gap (IG) measure used here is defined as the share of incentivized to non-incentivized forest potential
and includes the ‘‘gray area’’ (FMRL) as non-incentivized (IG-2). We alternately define the Incentive Gap as:
IG-1 = 1 S [(FMRL + New Cap + ARD + BioE)/Total Growth] (FMRL incentivized)
IG-2 = 1 S [(New Cap + ARD + BioE)/Total Growth] (FMRL non-incentivized)
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hand, many ‘‘winner’’ countries will find it virtually impossible
to use up their caps. For the Netherlands, the new cap far
exceeds potential estimated net removals and future growth
under FM by a factor of 1.4, and in the UK by a factor of 1.1.
Moreover, in contrast to the timber rich countries, any and all
carbon sequestration—whether in standing forests or HWP—
would remain eligible for carbon credits.
This has important implications for the ability of
Parties and EU Member states to take advantage of potential
forest-based carbon sequestration. This is further illustrated
by the second set of reddish brown points in Fig. 2, indicating
what we call the ‘‘Incentive Gap’’ (IG). In this particular
measure, we include the ‘‘gray area’’ (FMRL) in the share of
non-incentivized forest potential and express this as a share of
total forest potential in 2020. IG-1 is of course strongly
influenced by the size of the cap and is inversely related to
the new cap. EU Member states with greater forest cover have
disproportionately larger IG’s. The IG is typically smaller if we
exclude the ‘‘gray area’’ from the non-incentivized share (IG-
2)). Whether the gray area under the FMRL should be included
in estimates of the IG is debated in more detail elsewhere(Ellison et al., 2013). The basic trend, however, remains the
same regardless of which IG measure is chosen.
The Durban system will inevitably lead both to gross
inequities across countries and to severe imbalances in the
accounting system. A large share of EU Member states will thus
not be rewarded for any pursuit of increased forest growth,
despite the important contribution they could make to climate
change mitigation (and adaptation). Harvest will be encouraged.
This highlights the negative advantages associated with upward
limits on carbon credit eligibility. The current Durban cap fails to
mobilize full future forest growth and climate change mitigation
potential. The role and impact of the FMRL (the gray area inFig. 3)
is more complicated and is addressed below.
5.2. The Durban FMRL
The FMRL introduced in Durban imposes a host of problems
that require deeper consideration. We divide these into two
discussions; (1) the usefulness of modeled projections and
their placement in the correct climate policy framework, and
(2) the potential incentive structure created by the FMRL and
the broader LULUCF framework.
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Fig. 3 – The Durban LULUCF rules and potential forest growth in 2020 (by Member state).
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growth remaining in managed forests above the reference level and/or used for wood products, excluding bioenergy
harvest (BioE). AR represents the projected growth on afforested and reforested land, while D is the harvested part on
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(FMRL). Growth is projected proportionally across all categories (AR(D), FM + HWP and bio-energy) based on corresponding
values in 2008 and 2009. IG-1 is represented in figure by the area above the red dots to the top of the dark green column and
is considered to be ‘‘0%’’ for countries like the UK, Greece, the Netherlands, where both the cap (and the red dot) far surpass
forest potential. IG-2, logically equivalent to IG-1 + FMRL, removes the gray area from IG-1.
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number of problems. For one, Parties can intentionally
underestimate their potential to achieve future growth
and thereby ‘‘create’’ potential carbon credits. Moreover,
forest projections are subject to important uncertainties,
raising doubt about the ability of countries to adequately
estimate either future forest growth potential or future
demand for biomass resources (and thus harvest rates).
Finally, these projections—because they already embed
assumptions about future demand and thus increases in
the harvest—may ultimately reinforce this potential out-
come and further discourage the realization of future growth
potential.
Using modeled reference level projections for the purpose
of setting general emission reduction commitments may be
preferable (Ellison et al., 2013). Keeping the rule of crediting net
removals (gross-net accounting) renders accounting consis-
tent over commitment periods. Our preferred strategy is to use
a form of continuous gross-net accounting. We propose using
average net removals from the previous commitment period
(CP1) as a means for estimating and zeroing the new baselinefor net removal accounting in the subsequent accounting
period (CP0). The same model can also be used for adjusting
country level emission reduction commitments, thereby
eliminating bias in country projections and weakening
incentives to lowball estimates of future growth potential.
With an adequate baseline and adjusted country level
emission reduction commitments, Parties could be made
eligible for any and all LULUCF-based carbon credits (net
removals). In this way, and with the elimination of the cap,
future growth potential (carbon sequestration in standing
forests—‘‘net removals’’) would be fully incentivized accord-
ing to its real climate mitigation potential, thus lending it more
weight both in harvest calculations and in the climate policy
framework. Moreover, this strategy could potentially provide a
framework for coordinating with current efforts to raise
overall commitments for the 2030 EU climate policy frame-
work (EC, 2013).
In combination with the elimination of any and all caps on
net removals and the introduction of one all-encompassing
LULUCF carbon pool (integrating all LULUCF activities and
carbon pools into a single pool), such a strategy could
Table 2 – Post-Durban Kyoto LULUCF incentives: parties and landowners.
Scenarios From – To) Accounting
options
Party/government perspective Landowner perspective
Incentives
Logic
Incentives Incentives to
promote
Growth/Harvest?
No pass-
through
w/pass-through
(1) Up to FMRL Debits Only Harvest for bioenergy,
HWP not significantly
different from
Standing Forest
G/H Harvest for
bioenergy
Standing Forests,
HWP and
Bioenergy
For Parties: fully
incentivized. For
Landowners: HWP,
standing forests
not incentivized
w/o pass through.
(2) FMRL – cap Credits Only Harvest for bioenergy,
HWP not significantly
different from
Standing Forest
G/H Harvest for
bioenergy
Standing Forests,
HWP and
Bioenergy
fully incentivized
(3) cap – Total
FM removal
No Debits or
Credits
Harvest for bioenergy H Harvest for
bioenergy
Harvest for
bioenergy
HWP, Standing
Forests not
incentivized
Note: The ‘‘scenarios’’ refer to where individual countries may end up in terms of; (1) failing to meeting the FMRL projection, (2) fulfilling the
FMRL projection and being eligible for carbon credits under the cap, and (3) fulfilling the FMRL, making use of all available carbon credits under
the cap, and producing additional net removals above the cap. The table assumes that Governments (‘‘Parties’’) to the KP face different
incentives than Landowners.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 0 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 – 1 510potentially promote significant climate change mitigation
(and adaptation). This would have the effect of fully
incentivizing forest growth potential and fully rewarding all
net removals, effectively balancing the full value of carbon
sequestration in standing forests with competing uses.
Moreover, the inclusion of all carbon pools in one all-
encompassing model will increase incentives to care about
and potentially undertake actions to combat potential emis-
sions in other areas (e.g. unmanaged forests, peatlands, etc.).
Without consistent accounting across all activities and pools,
the impact of some is likely to be neglected or overlooked.
A second problem arises with interpreting the set of
incentives created by the Post-Durban rules and, in particular,
the FMRL. In Table 2, we present a discussion of the complex
range of incentives faced by Parties and Landowners in EU
Member states and the most likely outcomes resulting from
the Post-Durban Kyoto framework. Though the Kyoto
framework only incentivizes Parties, landowners ultimately
make the decision whether to harvest based on a variety of
economic incentives and personal preferences. The incentives
Parties and Landowners face depend on where individual
countries fall relative to their FMRL projections (commit-
ments). Thus, under Scenario 1, countries fail to meet their
FMRL commitments, while under Scenario 2, countries
succeed in meeting their commitments and are eligible to
receive some carbon credits under the cap. Finally, under
Scenario 3, countries meet their FMRL’s, are eligible for the full
cap, and produce additional net removals.
In particular because LULUCF is not mobilized in the EU
climate policy framework, no strategies have been developed
for transferring incentives (pass-through) to landowners.
Thus while Parties may face KP incentives, landowners may
respond to potentially contradictory incentives. Compellingly,
‘‘harvest for bioenergy’’ is always preferred (financial incen-
tives) unless the Post-Durban Kyoto incentives have beenintegrated into the domestic framework such that landowners
receive benefits (or debits). Parties can choose different
strategies for incentivizing Landowners. In addition to
transferring carbon credits, governments can also centrally
determine felling rates.
The second striking observation is that, independently of
the goals accompanying the adoption of the FMRL—Scenario
1—the incentive to harvest either for bioenergy or for HWP is
not significantly different from that for maintaining Standing
Forest. Though harvesting above the reference line (in the gray
area) results in debits, the potential financial return on
harvesting for bioenergy and/or HWP represents an attractive
alternative. Bioenergy is fully incentivized under this scenario
(resulting in carbon neutral emissions) and HWP is likewise
fully incentivized (it is recognized as a carbon pool under FM).
Thus where Parties (Landowners) are eligible for carbon
credits for net removals, Standing Forests, HWP and Bioenergy
are relatively equally incentivized.
The incentives remain the same under Scenario 2, where
Parties (Landowners) are eligible for carbon credits for net
removals under FM. The situation changes dramatically,
however, only under Scenario 3, where Parties (Landowners)
are no longer eligible for carbon credits. In this case, harvesting
for bioenergy will always be preferable over HWP or Standing
Forests (neither of which are incentivized beyond the cap).
Moreover, beyond the cap, Parties face strong incentives to
promote forest growth in order to achieve larger harvests, while
for Scenarios 1 and 2, Parties are likely indifferent between
growth for growth’s sake (G) and growth for Harvest (H).
Finally, under FM, the smaller the cap, the less Parties are
incentivized to consider it in their planning calculations and
the more likely they are to favor harvest. Timber-rich
countries like Sweden with comparatively small caps will
benefit little and will have significant difficulty estimating
exactly where they are likely to land by harvesting specific
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arises across the government and the many small private
landowners without centrally determined felling rates is
easily imagined. Moreover, as indicated under Scenario 3,
there are considerable disincentives to promote growth in
standing forests above the cap. This can result in Parties
strongly favoring/promoting harvest over fulfilling the cap.
Some Parties may thus experience stronger incentives to
harvest both above the cap and above the reference level.
The failure to effectively weight and incentivize the full
carbon value of forest-based carbon sequestration in standing
forests and HWP—whether due to reference levels or limits on
potential carbon credits—means forests are not weighted
according to their true climate mitigation potential. Thus,
unlike other sectors where the value of one ton of CO2 is equal
to one ton of CO2, forests would remain under-valued and thus
under-utilized. As suggested in Table 2, this may not result in
the most rational use of forest-based resources and may
negatively alter outcomes.
6. Negative emissions and forest potential in the
climate policy framework
The potential role of forests in promoting emission reductions
is frequently either disputed or even completely ignored. One
of the most recent reports to raise questions about the
potential role of forests is UNEP’s (2012) Emissions Gap Report.
This report highlights the current ‘‘gap’ in international
emission reduction commitments—based on Annex I and
non-Annex I country pledges in the Copenhagen Accord—that
must be closed in order to arrive at the proposed +2 8C global
warming target agreed in Copenhagen. The authors argue that
‘lenient LULUCF accounting rules’ potentially explain a part of
this emissions gap and suggest that ‘minimizing the use of
lenient Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)
credits and surplus emission credits would reduce the gap by
approximately 3 GtCO2e’ (UNEP, 2012: 4). Strict rules are in
place when: ‘allowances from LULUCF accounting and surplus
emission credits will not be counted toward the emission
reduction pledges’ (UNEP, 2012: 12). This definition parrots the
EU approach to LULUCF.
A recent joint report authored by the International Energy
Agency, Nordic Energy Research and a number of regional
research and energy institutes (Risø, VTT, etc.), ‘‘Nordic Energy
Technology Perspectives: Pathways to a Carbon Neutral
Energy Future’’ (IEA, 2013), indirectly makes a similar argu-
ment about the benefits of forest-based carbon sequestration.
The term LULUCF does not even appear in the document and
‘‘forests’’ are only mentioned in connection with the advan-
tages of bioenergy. While this report discusses and relies on
the potential advantages of carbon capture and storage (CCS),
it entirely neglects the natural process by which forests bind
carbon to biomass through photosynthesis, naturally creating
another important form of carbon sequestration.
The following example illustrates why the role of forests
should not be neglected in the development of Low Carbon
Pathways, and why, in particular, forests should be included
and more effectively mobilized. We base our example on
Sweden, where annual net LULUCF-sector removals currentlycompensate for approximately half of Sweden’s CO2 emis-
sions, but are not explicitly ‘counted’ or considered in the
climate policy framework, either in Sweden or the EU. The
example is broadly representative of the situation in a number
of EU Member states where net annual forest growth
(net removals) covers a large share of current emissions. In
Latvia, for example, total annual net removals represent
approximately 178% of annual GHG emissions (Fig. 1). Effi-
ciently and effectively mobilized, this share could be even
larger. As illustrated above, without adequate mobilization
there are strong incentives to increase harvest.
The Swedish example provides a powerful illustration of
the fact that the current UNFCCC/Kyoto LULUCF and EU
carbon accounting and climate policy frameworks may not
provide the optimal mobilization of forest-based climate
change mitigation and adaptation potential. Fig. 4 is based
on data from a recent Swedish EPA (2012) study that identifies
potential emission reduction scenarios potentially enabling
Sweden to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. To these
numbers and graphical representation, we add additional
information about the potential role of LULUCF and the impact
of the UNFCCC/Kyoto LULUCF carbon accounting rules both
before and after the 2011 Durban LULUCF agreement.
For CP1 (2008–2012) the short, solid light green columns
indicate total accountable net removals. The remainder of the
column (cross-hatched green and white) designates the
remaining net removals that cannot be accounted and for
which Sweden is not eligible to receive carbon credits. This is a
basic illustration of the Incentive Gap (IG): the larger share of net
removals is not incentivized by the carbon accounting rules.
For CP2 (2013–2020), a lot has changed. First, above the
new FMRL (‘‘gray area’’), Parties are not permitted to claim
carbon credits but can be debited if the harvest rises above
the reference line. On the other hand, Parties can claim
carbon credits between the FMRL and the cap (the solid-red
column below the FMRL), but are not eligible to claim carbon
credits beyond the cap. Thus regardless of the potential
Parties might have for achieving additional carbon seques-
tration, they remain ineligible to receive the benefits of this
effort. As suggested in Table 2, since additional growth
returns no credits, this may ultimately strengthen incen-
tives to harvest above the cap and perhaps even above the
reference level.
CP2 likewise helps to illustrate a second point. The logic
behind the use of reference levels makes sense from the
perspective of eliminating the potential for taking advantage
of net removals that might have occurred anyway. Parties are
only able to claim carbon credits below the reference line, net
removals (what many consider ‘‘historical’’, or ‘‘undeserved’’)
are thus potentially removed from the model. On the other
hand, under this agreement, Parties are being encouraged to
commit to specific levels of increased net removals that
continuously raise carbon stocks, and thus to forego harvest.
From this perspective, it remains unclear why Parties should
go unrewarded for any increased forest growth (net removals)
they achieve. After all, such removals provide a genuine
climate mitigation impact. In this sense, the FMRL seems
misguided and misplaced.
Fig. 4 illustrates the potential importance of forest-based
carbon sequestration as a means of achieving negative
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Fig. 4 – Swedish Emissions and the Role of Forests in Climate Change Mitigation.
Source: based on published data from a Swedish EPA (2012) report. The following estimates are added to this report: (1) an
estimate of potential forest-based carbon sequestration (2013–2020) based on Sweden’s UNFCCC reference level submission
and the Swedish cap on accountable LULUCF in CP2; (2) estimates of potential ‘‘net’’ emissions based on the Target 1 & 2
Scenarios after considering the impact of LULUCF + env. + prod. net removals; (3) an estimate of the potential Negative
Emissions, based on the ‘‘net’’ impact of Target + LULUCF scenarios; and (4) estimates for the HWP carbon pool have been
incorporated in the Target Scenario results. The LULUCF scenarios investigated in the Swedish EPA study are based on
estimates of the highest potential sustainable harvest and do not consider the potential impact of revised incentives or
change in demand for forest biomass.
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Vuren et al., 2013; Rhodes and Keith, 2008; Mo¨llersten et al.,
2003; Obersteiner et al., 2001), either in terms of the added
contribution of afforestation and reforestation, closed system
contribution of biomass energy production with carbon
capture and storage, the ‘‘permanent’’ removal of carbon
from the atmosphere. We here emphasize the potential role of
increased forest-based carbon sequestration in standing
forests and HWP, in combination with the broad panorama
of more traditional emission reduction pathways. In this
sense, we define negative emissions for individual countries
as the fact of ‘removing more carbon from the atmosphere
than is being poured into it’. I.e. we define negative emissions
for individual countries as occurring when the balance of
emissions and removals results in a net uptake of carbon from
the atmosphere.
If Sweden is able to reduce emissions in the way suggested
by either one of the two Target Scenarios (UNFCCC, 2012a; EC,
2012a) depicted above and is likewise able to grow additionalforest—by additional forest preserve set-asides (‘‘env.’’),
additional fertilization (‘‘prod.’’), or a combination of both—
the net effect of additional carbon sequestration in standing
forests (net removals) could pay the dividend of ‘‘negative
emissions’’ (Sweden would sequester more carbon than it
emits) by as early as 2029 (Target Scenario 1 + env. + prod.). As
indicated, negative emissions are achieved somewhat later
under the other scenarios (2030, 2041 or 2044). The key point is
that negative emissions can be achieved and even possibly
improved upon with the inclusion of standing forests in the
climate policy framework.
Incentivizing the HWP carbon pool is likewise important.
On average, the inclusion of the HWP carbon pool in the
LULUCF scenarios increases the potential for achieving
negative emissions and advances their achievement by approx-
imately one year (Fig. 4 includes the HWP contribution). In
Sweden, on average the HWP carbon pool represents
approximately 14% of total net removals. However, since
the ‘‘cap’’ is imposed equally on FM net removals and HWP, the
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entirely marginalized.
The potential for achieving negative emissions is perhaps the
strongest justification for getting rid of the cap and eliminating
all remaining obstacles to the mobilization of LULUCF in the
EU and UNFCCC/Kyoto climate policy frameworks. Due to the
urgency of the climate challenge, some have begun to argue
that only negative emissions can facilitate atmospheric CO2
reductions sufficient to stay within the +2 8C global warming
target (Moss et al., 2010; Milne and Field, 2012). Though this
point is typically raised in discussions about carbon capture
and storage (CCS) technologies, effective and efficient forest
resource mobilization can also provide an important contri-
bution. As illustrated by the Swedish example and data
presented in Ellison et al. (2013: Table 6), considerable
potential for future forest growth remains across Europe.
For the most part without fertilization and within the same
area, the total forest stock in Sweden, for example, has more
than doubled over the period 1923–2013.
The Swedish emission reduction scenarios considered
above represent a select array of potential future scenarios.
Which path will ultimately be chosen remains unknown. More
importantly, none of the scenarios considered, including those
we have projected, adequately consider the potential impact
of improving EU and KP incentives on forest growth. Full
mobilization of the full carbon value in future forest growth
could effectively help accelerate these relationships.
Finally, though the conventional view suggests only
countries with comparatively large shares of forest cover
can benefit, countries with comparatively low shares of forest
cover and low amounts of net annual forest growth (net
removals) may exhibit the greatest potential for future forest
growth. Given the extent of required emission reductions by
2050 (80–90% or more), low forest area countries may have a
more difficult time arriving at the negative emissions threshold.
However both individual countries and the global community
could benefit from incentivizing this potential.
7. Conclusion: a more comprehensive carbon
accounting framework?
In the context of a ‘‘more comprehensive accounting frame-
work’’ for LULUCF in the EU and Kyoto processes, the EU
remains open to suggestions from all Parties and EU Member
states. As the EU likewise appears to emphasize (UNFCCC,
2012a), what defines such a framework and how Parties should
attempt to reply is ambiguous. In important ways, the SBSTA
request for Party input places all features of the current LULUCF
carbon accounting framework back on the table.
In the EU SBSTA submission (UNFCCC, 2012a) and in the
documents relating to current EU efforts to re-define the role
of LULUCF in the EU climate policy framework, specific
parameters are rapidly being set. In particular, with respect
to the linkage of the EU ETS with international carbon-trading
frameworks, LULUCF and REDD+, the EU appears set on
creating a separate system that would continue and further
compound the current degree of separation and compart-
mentalization in the elements of the climate policy framework
(ETS, non-ETS/ESD and LULUCF). Likewise, the Commission isnot considering removing restrictions on the total amount of
claimable LULUCF-based carbon credits; ‘‘It was our under-
standing that most Parties do not consider unconstrained gross
net accounting as a possible accounting option for the future
and, therefore, it has not been included as an option in the
submission. However, constrained gross-net (establishing a cap,
discount, or other appropriate mechanism) could be explored as
an option’’ (UNFCCC, 2012a: our emphasis).
As the idealized model expresses (Table 1 above), both the
EU and the greater Kyoto process should embrace a more
expansive concept of LULUCF integration in the international
climate policy framework. Such steps should involve serious
evaluation of the limits set on future forest growth and forest-
base carbon sequestration. We favor the elimination of all
obstacles to the full mobilization of forest-based resources and
the recognition of their full carbon value. Discounting the forest-
based sector (cap and the FMRL) should be abandoned.
Reference projections—or a suitable alternative such as
average forest growth over the most recent commitment
period (CP1)—can alternatively be used for estimating future
potential emission reduction commitments.
The general LULUCF carbon accounting approach should
ideally be much broader, should incorporate all
LULUCF-related activities—including unmanaged forests,
wetlands and peat lands—and should not complicate this
process with the far too complex estimation of additional
reference levels in each forest activity. This would require
countries to adopt untimely and costly approaches to LULUCF-
based carbon management, thereby reducing the overall
efficiency of the climate policy framework.
Table 3 highlights the basic differences between the EU
position and our idealized model. Apart from the points noted
above, we highlight that powerful incentives for mobilizing
the full carbon value in forest-based resources are likewise
most efficiently promoted by an international carbon-trading
framework not closed to forest-based carbon credits.
The SBSTA call for Party submissions on a ‘more compre-
hensive LULUCF accounting framework’ provides an opportu-
nity for further consideration of the potential role of LULUCF in
the EU and international climate policy frameworks. The EU is
actively considering potential improvements. The introduc-
tion, in particular, of harmonized LULUCF carbon accounting
practices across the EU Member states and the introduction of
mandatory reporting on CM and GM activities represents a
step in the right direction. But much more could clearly be
done. Moreover, the general framework for successful climate
change mitigation faces the ever-present risk of disintegrating
international cooperation. Much uncertainty thus shrouds the
future role of forests in the global framework and requires an
urgent and forceful response.
Regarding the EU climate policy framework, forests and
their climate change mitigation (and adaptation) potential do
not weigh equally with other mitigation pathways in the
power, industry or non-ETS sectors and will not be freely
tradable across the different EU action frameworks (ETS, non-
ETS/ESD and LULUCF). However, in order to fully mobilize
forest resource-based carbon sequestration, one unit of
climate change mitigation must equal one unit of climate
change mitigation, regardless of where improvements occur.
And all carbon credits must be fully tradable across the
Table 3 – Comparison of EU positions and idealized model.
Issue EU position Idealized model
LULUCF accounting unbalanced
with respect to emissions
from other sectors (industry,
end-users, etc.)?
Yes. The EU takes the position that LULUCF
cannot be successfully integrated into the EU ETS
and/or EDS frameworks. Thus the EU favors a
system in which LULUCF is accounted separately
and for which targets are likewise set
independently from the ETS and non-ETS
sectors. Moreover, forest-based carbon
sequestration (net removals) is not counted
toward EU-level emission reduction
commitments, and trading in carbon credits
across segments is prohibited.
No. LULUCF should be fully integrated into
international carbon/emission trading
frameworks. The principle of ‘‘full carbon value’’
should be fully integrated into this system.
Carbon credits should be fully fungible across
different segments of the climate policy
framework. Relevant models, such as the
California and New Zealand carbon trading
schemes exist.
Inclusion of additional
carbon pools?
The EU promotes an inventory framework
broadly similar to the UNFCCC/Kyoto approach.
The EU likewise favors further integration of
remaining omitted carbon pools and has begun
integrating CM and GM ahead of the UNFCCC.
The EU will consider collapsing Art’s. 3.3 and 3.4
into a single category but notes the need to limit
accounting with the continued use of caps and
other restrictions (such as the FMRL).
An all-encompassing model with mandatory
reporting for all previously omitted and
voluntary carbon pools.
All emissions and removals should have the
same weight as any other component in the
carbon/emission trading schemes and should be
based only on assumed climate mitigation
potentials, without restrictions or caps.
Permanence The problem of permanence requires
restrictions.
Solved by debiting emissions (the same as for
fossil fuel-based emissions).
Additionality No credits for historically undeserved growth. Credits for all removals and debits for all
emissions. Not providing credits for FM or
unmanaged land can create incentives for
increased harvest and disincentives to address
emissions, in particular on unmanaged lands.
Uncertainty Uncertainty provides one of the principal
justifications for discounting in LULUCF carbon
accounting.
While estimates in individual years may be
inaccurate, in the longer term and averaged over
longer periods, the relative impact of uncertainty
is diminished. Measurement accuracy is
improving.
Natural disturbances The EU basically supports the UNFCCC model
adopted in Durban. As a strategy for protecting
Parties from bearing the burden of natural
disturbances, this model relies on the
opportunity to omit land areas under FM and AR
affected by natural disturbances from
accounting.
It is preferable to incorporate all land and forest
activities into one all-encompassing National
inventory and to make the full carbon value of all
activities fully fungible in international carbon
trading. This will provide important incentives to
address vulnerabilities in the LULUCF sector.
Harmonization with
UNFCCC framework?
There are important differences. From our
perspective, the most important is the different
treatment of forest-based carbon sequestration
and how fungible it is in carbon/emission trading
frameworks. Thus far, EU proposals reject the
idea of integrating LULUCF into the carbon/
emission trading framework
LULUCF should be fully integrated into
international carbon/emission trading
frameworks. The principle of ‘‘full carbon value’’
should be fully integrated and all carbon credits
should be fully fungible across different
segments of the climate policy framework. The
California and New Zealand carbon trading
schemes provide relevant models.
Source: the EU position is based on our best knowledge of the EU’s current goals, in particular as expressed in UNFCCC (2012b) and EC (2012b).
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this, investors are not free to choose the most efficient and
effective strategies, thereby slowing progress toward climate
change mitigation. Achieving this goal in an international
carbon-trading framework would provide the greatest poten-
tial for achieving the international goal of rapid climate
change mitigation.
Forests offer tremendous opportunities for carbon se-
questration and fossil fuel substitution. Moreover their
value as biodiversity anchors, planetary lungs and their
crucial importance as regulators of the terrestrial hydrologic
cycle render them invaluable. The excessive limitationsplaced on the ability of Parties to take full advantage
of the opportunities forest resources provide represent
unnecessary obstacles to the goals of climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Forests can play an important,
even fundamental role in this process and can more
importantly provide the singular contribution of negative
emissions. While the new ‘‘cap’’ chosen in Durban increases
incentives at the national level, there is little justification for
remaining limitations. Ideally, these should be removed
from the carbon accounting system. Even with the new and
slightly larger cap, the magnitude of missed opportunities
remains unacceptably large.
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